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Abstract—Sometimes a security-critical decision must be made
using information provided by peers. Think of routing messages,
user reports, sensor data, navigational information, blockchain
updates. Attackers manifest as peers that strategically report
fake information. Trust models use the provided information,
and attempt to suggest the correct decision. A model that
appears accurate by empirical evaluation of attacks may still be
susceptible to manipulation. For a security-critical decision, it is
important to take the entire attack space into account. Therefore,
we define the property of robustness: the probability of deciding
correctly, regardless of what information attackers provide. We
introduce the notion of realisations of honesty, which allow us
to bypass reasoning about specific feedback. We present two
schemes that are optimally robust under the right assumptions.
The “majority-rule” principle is a special case of the other scheme
which is more general, named “most plausible realisations”.
Index Terms—Provable robustness, malicious reporting, trust-
based security.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the internet, users or agents encounter situations where
they need to make decisions without sufficient direct expe-
rience or observations, e.g., deciding whether to install an
app. Feedback from peers helps enrich their knowledge about
the subject and make better decisions. For example, rating
system of an app store enables its users to share comments
about whether an app crashes, whether its user interface is
friendly, and whether it respects privacy, etc. In trust-based
secure routing, reports about the reliability of a node from
witnesses can be referred to decide whether to choose it as
the next hop [1]. Moreover, sharing security information e.g.,
indicators, malware reports, threat intelligence reports allows
users or organisations to learn from the experience of others
and seek advice, thereby improving their security posture [2],
[3].
The crucial commonality between these scenarios, is the
possibility of a malicious source (attacker) reporting fake feed-
back, potentially causing misguided decisions. For example,
some accounts of an app store may be bribed or compromised
to provide fake positive review to an app. Malicious feedback
This work is supported by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences
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will put a system under threat, when they are used for security-
critical decision making. Consider trust-based routing, wrong
routing messages may cause packets to be transferred to a
compromised node.
The issue of how to use potentially malicious feedback
is well-studied. One way to deal with inaccurate feedback
sources is to develop a trust system/model, and simulate its
accuracy. Another way is to implement and use such a system,
and determine the accuracy empirically. Both simulated and
empirical models base their analysis on the existing types of
malicious strategies employed by attackers. An alternative is to
use game theory to reason about malicious behaviour before it
is observed. Typically, systems are set up to punish malicious
behaviour and reward honest behaviour. Finally, it is possible
to apply formal reasoning to find the conditions under which
decisions are good or bad. Typical examples would be: “if
attackers control less than 50% of the resources”, or “if the
trusted third party is not compromised”.
Simulated/empirical models cannot predict what happens if
attackers change their behaviour; they are reactive. Although
incentive-based approaches are proactive regarding attacker
behaviour, they assume that the attack goals are set in stone.
Given a new utility function, a certain type of malicious
behaviour may now have a positive pay-off, despite there
being a punishment. It is desirable to consider the entire
attack space. The issue with condition-based models is that all
the guarantees are merely conditional, and we do not know
whether the conditions are actually met. Our approach is a
generalisation of the condition-based models: although we
may not know whether the conditions are met, there may be an
overwhelming probability that they are. We focus on proving
when there is an overwhelming probability that the conditions
for making a good decision are met.
We model feedback-based decision making as a function,
with the input being a set of reported data (feedback), and
the output being a choice of a belief or an action. Once
we know which option is true, the corresponding decision is
clear. Consider an example of deciding whether to install a
software based on its security property, feedback set includes
two options: “is malware” and “not malware”. Based on the
knowledge about the reporters, if the scheme trusts the first
option, then the action “not install” is selected. Honest sources
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report the true option, while malicious sources (attackers)
report strategically – with an unknown strategy. Each source
has a certain probability of being honest. As we want to be
proactive regarding malicious behaviour, we may not assume
what strategies an attacker would take, but consider the entire
attack space in a given decision making context. And we
allow attackers to know the decision scheme considering that
to rely on secrecy is a poor practice for security (e.g. NIST
recommends against this in systems security [4]).
There are several properties that we aim to achieve for a
decision scheme. The most important property we define is
ε-robustness, meaning that the probability that the scheme
decides correctly is at least 1 − ε, no matter what feedback
attackers provide. Another property is optimality, meaning
that no other decision scheme has better robustness. The final
property is monotonicity, meaning that robustness does not
decrease if we use more feedback sources. We prove that the
simple “follow majority” decision scheme is robust, monotonic
and optimal, if all feedback sources are equally probable to be
honest (e.g. all strangers). For the more interesting case, where
sources are not equal, we propose a new decision scheme
(“most plausible realisations”), and prove that it is robust,
monotonic and optimal too. Trust evaluation can be used to
estimate the probability of a source being malicious, but these
estimates may be inaccurate or biased. We use simulations
to investigate how actual attacks relate to the notion of
manipulation. The simulations also show that our results are
not very sensitive to the quality of the estimates. Finally,
we discuss how to build upon our results to move towards
applications where our assumptions need to be adapted.
II. SECURE DECISIONS BASED ON FEEDBACK
The goal of this paper is to introduce a general method-
ology to make decisions that are almost certainly correct, in
the existence of malicious feedback sources (attackers). The
attackers try to manipulate our decisions. If the probability that
the attacker successfully manipulates us is less than ε, then we
achieved ε-robustness. Our decision, therefore, is correct with
probability 1 − ε, despite manipulation attempts. We do not
assume specific attacker strategy (such as rational attackers,
or attackers that follow a particular template), but allow them
total freedom to select their manipulative feedback.
A. Model
We aim to introduce a general methodology to approach
feedback in a way that allows resistance to manipulation by
design. Of course, in a situation where all sources of feedback
are malicious, one can be manipulated. However, the probabil-
ity of this situation occurring is typically increasingly small as
more sources are used. On the other hand, it is possible that all
sources of feedback are honest, in which case no manipulation
can occur. The probability of this situation is also increasingly
small with more sources. It gets interesting when some sources
are malicious and some are honest. In those situations, whether
or not manipulation can occur depends on the way decisions
are made. In this section, we introduce the concepts required
to reason about decisions and manipulation.
Decisions are made using a decision scheme. A decision
scheme is a function that outputs a decision based on the
received feedback. The feedback comes in the form of a
discrete value (called an option) selected by a source1 in a
given set. Formally:
Definition 1 (Decision Scheme).
– There is a set of sources S = {0, . . . ,m− 1}.
– There is a set of feedback options O = {0, . . . , n− 1}.
– There is a set of decisions Q = {0, . . . , ν−1}. Only one
decision is correct in a decision making task.
– Feedback f ∈ F is an m-tuple: f = (f0, . . . , fm−1),
where fs represents the feedback option reported by
source s : s ∈ S and fs ∈ O.
– A decision scheme is a function D : F → Q.
A decision scheme works in a specific context, which is
defined by S,O,Q. For different contexts, a system will need
to select which decision scheme is appropriate. For example,
given O,Q, two schemes are required for m = 10 and m =
100. A decision mechanism selects an appropriate decision
scheme, based on context.
Informally, manipulation is when malicious sources select
their feedback to ensure that D(f) results in the incorrect
decision. The malicious sources are aware of what our decision
scheme is, and if we alter D , then they change their feedback
accordingly. Say D(0, 1, 0) = 0 and D(0, 1, 1) = 1, and
we receive (f0, f1, f2) = (0, 1, 0). If the third source is
malicious and 0 is the correct decision, he would provide the
feedback 1, and vice versa. So if we receive (0, 1, 0), then
the correct decision is 1 and if we receive (0, 1, 1) then it’s
0. Unfortunately, if we change D so that D(0, 1, 0) = 1 and
D(0, 1, 1) = 0 to reflect this, then the attacker responds by
swapping his feedback around. Hence, basing the decision
scheme on the feedback is problematic, as the feedback (of
attackers) depends on the decision scheme. We introduce the
notion of realisations, allowing us not to reason explicitly
about feedback, bypassing this issue altogether.
When receiving feedback, some of the sources providing it
will have been honest, and others malicious. Informally, this
is what a realisation is. Formally:
Definition 2 (Realisation). A realisation r ⊆ S is the set of
sources that are honest.
The set of all realisations R is the powerset of sources 2S .
The complement of a realisation is: r = S \ r.
A realisation indicates which sources are honest and which
are not. We use the phrase “under realisation r” to mean
“assume all s ∈ r are honest and all s ∈ r are malicious”.
Of course, when receiving feedback from sources, the
recipient does not know the realisation (as the recipient does
1We use the abstract term “source”, since it does not matter for our
purposes whether or not the source is a person, an agent, a sensor, a device.
As long as it provides manipulative data if it is (controlled by) an attacker,
but useful information if it is not.
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not know who is honest or malicious). But, depending on how
the recipient makes decisions, he is open to manipulation in
some realisations, but cannot be manipulated in others. Of
course, some ways of making decisions are superior to others
as they allow manipulation less often. Our goal is to make
decisions in such a way that it is improbable to be manipulable.
This is helpful for security critical decisions.
If a source s is honest under the realisation (s ∈ r), then
s does not try to manipulate the decision scheme. What s
reports (fs), does not depend on the decision scheme being
used and is not affected by attackers’ choices. We call this
the weak assumption of honesty. If s is not honest, then he
is an attacker. Attackers are aware of the decision scheme,
hence able to pick fs depending on which decision scheme
is used. This means that s can provide any feedback (true or
false) in O. If there are multiple attackers under the realisation,
then their feedback may contain diverse options, of which all
combinations must be considered. We call the set of all the
possible feedback given a realisation the attack space (of the
realisation).
Intuitively, feedback from honest sources should lead to the
correct decision. In this paper, we make a stronger simplifying
assumption, namely that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between which decision is correct, and which feedback honest
sources provide. This means that feedback of honest sources
are the same and it maps to the correct decision. We call this
the strong assumption of honesty. To simplify notation, we
can use equality to model the one-to-one correspondence, and
claim that the feedback that an honest source provides is the
correct decision. Accordingly, we have O = Q.
Under the strong assumption of honesty, given a realisation
r and c ∈ Q as the correct decision, we can only receive
feedback f where every s ∈ r reports c (i.e. fs = c). The
malicious sources, however, are not restricted and can provide
any feedback in O. We refer to this as the attack space:
Definition 3 (Attack Space). The attack space is a function
a : Q×R → F . If the correct decision is c and the realisation
is r, then a(c, r) = {f ∈ F|∀s∈r(fs = c)} is the set of all the
possible feedback we could receive.
Being non-manipulable under a realisation means that no
matter what feedback the attackers report, the decision scheme
always decides correctly.
Definition 4 (Non-Manipulability). A decision scheme D
is considered non-manipulable under a realisation r when:
∀c ∈ Q and ∀f ∈ a(c, r), D(f) = c.
If a scheme D is non-manipulable under r, then we say r
is non-manipulable for D . The set D̂ is the set of all non-
manipulable realisations for D .
Reasoning backwards, we may wonder whether for a set
of realisations R ⊆ R, it is possible to have a decision
scheme which is non-manipulable under all realisations r ∈ R.
Unfortunately, being non-manipulable in all realisations R is
impossible. For example, the realisation where all the sources
are malicious (r = ∅) is always manipulable. We define that
a set of realizations R is attainable, if there exists a D for
which all r ∈ R are non-manipulable.
Definition 5 (Attainable). A set of non-manipulable realisa-
tions R ⊆ R is attainable: A(R) if and only if there exists a
decision scheme D such that R ⊆ D̂ .
As it turns out, whether or not a set of realisations is
attainable is characterised by a simple predicate, not involving
actual decision schemes or feedback. This characterisation is
the basis of our claim that we do not need to focus on actual
feedback. A set of realisations is attainable, if and only if every
pair of realisations shares at least one source:
Theorem 1. A(R) if and only if ∀r1,r2∈R(r1 ∩ r2 = ∅).
Proof. To see that ∀r1∈R,r2∈R(r1 ∩ r2 = ∅) is a necessary
condition for A(R), assume that r1 and r2 are disjoint. Select
f s.t. ∃s : s ∈ r1 ∧ fs = c1. Since s ∈ r2, f ∈ a(c1, r1) and
f ∈ a(c2, r2). Either D(f) = c2 or D(f) = c1.
We show that ∀r1∈R,r2∈R(r1 ∩ r2 = ∅) is a sufficient
condition for A(R) by constructing a decision scheme D so
that R ⊆ D̂ . If possible, pick D so that D(f) = x, when
there exists a realisation r ∈ R such that for all sources s ∈ r,
fs = x. If there are multiple realisations r1 and r2 where
for all sources s ∈ r1, fs = x and for all t ∈ r2, ft = y,
then x = y, since r1 and r2 share at least one source. So
our choice of D has at most one value x per f , such that we
require D(f) = x, and thus D exists.
Theorem 1 implies that a realization and its complement
cannot coexist in an attainable set of realizations. An impor-
tant corollary follows this observation, which states that the
maximum size of an attainable set of realisations is half of the
total possible realisations.
Corollary 1. If A(R), then |R| ≤ 1/2|R|.
Proof. Theorem 1, that r and r cannot both be in R. At most,
R = 1/2|R|, with R\R being the set of its complements.
In conclusion, our approach focuses on the possible reali-
sations (honesty states of sources), rather than on the actual
feedback. This allows us to reason more clearly about the
attack spaces in different scenarios. Using the assumption that
there is a bijection between honest feedback and correct deci-
sions, we were able to further specify the model. Importantly,
we show that by appropriately selecting the realisations under
which we wish to be non-manipulable, we know a decision
scheme exists where we indeed are non-manipulable under
these realis-ations. Immediate corollaries are the fact that at
most half the realisations allow us to be non-manipulable, and
that only either one realisation or its complement can be non-
manipulable.
B. Probability
Corollary 1 proves that given an arbitrary set of sources,
at least half of the realisations are manipulable, hence the
possibility that an arbitrary decision scheme gets manipulated
always exists. However, it may be the case that manipulable
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realisations are improbable. We can define the probabilistic
notion of ε-robustness to capture the idea that the probability
of being under a manipulable realisation, is at most ε. To do
so, we introduce probability in this section.
Being manipulated means making incorrect decisions based
on feedback. To achieve a notion of robustness, we have to
consider the entire attack space of a given set of malicious
sources. We cannot make assumptions about the probability
distribution of the feedback that attackers provide.
Below, we introduce a way to compute the probability of
deciding incorrectly for a given decision making task, named
as error rate. First, let variable C model what the correct
decision is. The outcomes of C are from the set Q: c ∈ Q.
Let random variable R model the realisation we are under, and
previously defined r ∈ R is its outcome. Let random variable
I be the decision. Based on the law of total probability, error
rate: p(I=c | C=c) = ∑r∈R p(R = r | C = c) · p(I =
c | R = r, C = c). Whether a source is honest or not does
not depend on C. Hence, p(R = r | C = c) = p(R = r).
Define the distribution Δ on R s.t. Δ(r) = P (R = r). The
distribution Δ provides a context to the sources, by defining
how probable it is that certain sources are honest.
The decision I is defined by the decision scheme when
provided with feedback. Let random variable F denote the
received feedback, and f : f ∈ F is its outcome. Given
realisation r and the correct decision c, all possible feedback
is in the attack space a(c, r), which is the support of F.
The decision I equals D(f), and p(I = c | F = f) = 1
iff D(f) = c. Hence: p(I = c | R = r, C = c) =∑
f∈a(c,r)∧D(f)=c p(F = f | R = r, C = c).
We use a shorthand notation to describe the probability
distribution of feedback in an attack space: β(r, c)(f) = p(F =
f |R = r, C = c). Since honest sources only report the correct
decision under the strong assumption, the distribution β(r, c)
is purely determined by attackers. Different β(r, c) describes
different strategy of attackers within the space a(c, r). And
p(I = c | R = r, C = c) = ∑f∈a(c,r)∧D(f)=c β(r, c)(f).
With Δ and β, we can derive a general formula of error
rate Err(D ,Δ, β) = p(I = c | C = c):





Δ(r) · β(r, c)(f) (1)
Note, when Δ and D are given, the error rate is in control of
attackers, specifically purely determined by β. Next, we study
three properties of a decision scheme in terms of its error rate.
C. Properties
The three properties that we are interested in studying are
robustness, optimality and monotonicity. A decision scheme
that is robust, optimal and monotonic has the highest proba-
bility of not being manipulated and does not degrade in quality
unexpectedly. These are the properties we require for secure-
decision making. Note that the focus on these three properties
does mean that we do not always obtain the same degree of
accuracy in some scenarios.
Robustness means resistance to being manipulated. We do
not want to assume any strategy for providing feedback to de-
fine robustness. Instead, we consider all possible distributions
within the relevant attack spaces. Robustness in a context Δ
is then determined by the maximal error rate:
E(D) = maxβ (Err(D ,Δ, β)) (2)
We can now define robustness:
Definition 6 (ε-robustness). Given a value ε, a set of sources
S and a distribution Δ of realisations, a decision scheme is
ε-robust when for all distributions β of feedback:
Err(D ,Δ, β) ≤ ε.
Equivalently, we can say E(D) ≤ ε. However, an even
simpler computation of robustness – that only reasons about
realisations – can be provided:
Theorem 2. If a decision scheme D is ε-robust, then∑
r∈R\D̂
Δ(r) ≤ ε.
Proof. It suffices to prove that E(D) =
∑
r∈R\D̂ Δ(r). We
first simplify the inner sum in Equation 1. If r is non-
manipulable (r ∈ D̂) (Definition 4), then f : f∈a(c, r) ∧
D(f) =c, and ∑f∈a(c,r)∧D(f)=c β(r, c)(f)=0. Contrarily, if r
is (r ∈ D̂), then ∃f : f∈a(c, r) ∧ D(f) =c. Select a point
distribution β(r, c) = 1 for that value f . Then, trivially,∑
f∈a(c,r)∧D(f)=c β(r, c)(f)=1. Hence, this choice of β sat-
isfies Err(D , r, β) =
∑
r∈R\D̂ Δ(r). As there is no way to
increase a probability beyond 1, this choice is maximal.
By reasoning purely about the realisations, we can reach
conclusions about whether or not we can be manipulated,
without having to reason about the possible strategies that
the attackers might employ. Given the fact that trust systems
make deductions explicitly using the specific feedback, it is
encouraging that we can prove that this is not necessary,
simplifying the problem domain significantly.
For a sufficiently large ε, many decision schemes will be
ε-robust. In general, we are interested in selecting a decision
scheme that can be claimed to be robust with a minimal ε, or
E(D); i.e. the scheme that has maximal robustness. This idea
is captured by the optimality property:
Definition 7 (Optimality). For a given distribution Δ of
realisations, D is optimal when for all D ′, E(D) ≤ E(D ′).
Or, equivalently, an ε-robust scheme D is optimal if there
does not exist a scheme D ′ which is ε′-robust and ε′<ε.
The last property is monotonicity. Monotonicity requires
that adding a source of information to the feedback does
not decrease robustness. As mentioned before, a different
number of sources means a different decision context. We are,
therefore, comparing two different decision schemes, that arise
from the same decision mechanism:
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Definition 8 (Monotonicity). A decision mechanism is mono-
tonic, when for all pairs of decision schemes D1 (using
sources S1) and D2 (using sources S2), if S1 ⊆ S2, then
E(D1) ≥ E(D2).
Or, equivalently, for every ε, if D1 is ε-robust then D2 is
also ε-robust. Using more sources does not harm robustness.
III. MAJORITY RULE
Majority rule is a principle applied for a variety of reasons.
If the decision being made affects everyone involved, then
fairness is a big reason to apply majority rule. In the case that
a user wants to make a decision that involves his own security,
fairness towards the sources is unlikely to be a consideration.
Nevertheless, majority rule occasionally pops up as a decision
scheme in these scenarios too. As we demonstrate in this
section, it turns out that majority rule can be the optimal way
to make robust decisions under the right circumstances.
The feedback reporting scenarios in this section are simple
scenarios where all sources are treated as interchangeable and
independent (e.g., when it is difficult to characterise individual
sources). Then, all m sources have some fixed probability p
of being honest; so Δ(r) = p|r| ·(1−p)m−|r| = δm,p. In these
(simple) scenarios, majority rule is optimal.
Consider the decision scheme Mm,p, which outputs the
decision that more than m/2 sources provided as feedback.
In case no such feedback exist it follows the feedback from
the source 0 ∈ S . Formally:
Definition 9 (Majority Rule Decision Scheme). If there is a
decision d s.t. |{s ∈ S|fs = d}| > m/2, then the majority rule
decision scheme has Mm,p(f) = d. Otherwise Mm,p(f) = f0.
Our focus is typically on the decision scheme, but we
may use the symbol M to denote the majority rule decision
mechanism, which selects the appropriate decision scheme
Mm,p based on context m and p.
Observe that if Alice’s feedback is x, Bob and Charlie’s
is y and Dave and Elsa’s is z, then we decide x, as Alice
is the tie-breaker because she is the first source (source 0).
This sounds counter-intuitive, but it is one of the optimal
ways of deciding (as we prove later). However, if we look
at this situation through the lens of realisations, we can see
that whatever the truth is, at least 3 sources are malicious.
These three sources could have simply provided the same fake
feedback, and have obtained a majority, thus manipulating the
decision scheme. Whatever the realisation is that lead to the
feedback, the realisation is manipulable under the majority
rule decision scheme. So, although the majority rule scheme is
dependent on the actual feedback, the analysis of the decision
scheme is simpler when done through the realisations.
Recall that every decision scheme has an associated set of
non-manipulable realisations. The corresponding set of non-
manipulable realisations for the majority rule decision scheme
is straightforward: a realisation r is in M̂m,p, when more than
half of the sources are honest, or if exactly half the sources
are honest and s0 is honest:
Lemma 1. M̂m,p = {r ∈ R | |r| > m/2∨(|r| = m/2∧0 ∈ r)}
Proof. Honest sources always report the correct decision.
When |r| > m/2, the correct decision would be the majority
in the received feedback. When |r| = m/2, we trusts the first
source, and we make correct decision if he is honest.
A. Properties of Majority Rule
The robustness of majority rule can be expressed using the
cumulative binomial distribution Fbin(k;m, p) (the binomial
distribution is fbin(k;m, p)). Via Definition 6:





2 ;m, p) m mod 2 =0
Fbin(
m
2 −1;m, p) + 12fbin(m2 ;m, p) m mod 2=0
Proof. The probability of getting at most k honest sources
within m sources is Fbin(k;m, p). Lemma 1 states that strictly
over half the sources being honest in a realisation is sufficient
to be non-manipulable. If the number of sources is odd, then it
is only possible to be manipulated when the honest sources are
in the minority, i.e. k < m2 , with probability: Fbin(
m−1
2 ;m, p).
If the number of sources is even, then another possibility being
manipulated is in case of a tie. But even then, there is at least
a 50% chance that the realisation is non-manipulable, since
the first source is in the correct block in half the equiprobable
permutations. This is why we must add 1/2fbin(
m
2 ;m, p).
An intuition why M is optimal under any possible values
of m, p is that, since p > 1/2, a realisation r where a majority
is honest is always more probable than its complement r. For
realisations r that have exactly the same amount of honest
and malicious sources, their complements r are equiprobable.
Simply selecting an arbitrary half of these realisations is
therefore optimal; we select the half where s0 is honest
(leaving the half where s0 is malicious). Formally:
Theorem 4. Given m sources with p ≥ 1/2, Mm,p is optimal.
Proof. M̂m,p includes exactly a half of all the possible
realizations, which is the maximum amount of realisations,
according to Corollary 1. It contains all the realisations r
where honest sources outnumber the malicious ones, and vice
versa for the complement r. So δm,p(r) = p
|r|(1− p)m−|r| >
(1− p)|r|pm−|r| = δm,p(r). It may contain realisations where
honest sources are equal in number to malicious ones, in which
case δm,p(r) = δm,p(r). Either way δm,p(r) ≥ δm,p(r), so
M̂m,p never contains the smaller of the pair.
Below, we apply a Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate
how the error rate (probability of making incorrect decisions)
of Mm,p changes with different values of honesty p and the
number of sources m. m sources are selected from a large
pool with a fraction p of honest sources. Honest sources will
rate the correct decisions, but malicious sources rate according
to the coordinated attack: all attackers provide the same lie.
The majority rule scheme simply follows the majority, and
the fraction of incorrect decisions is graphed in Fig. 1. Not
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(a) Per probability of honesty. (b) Per number of sources.
Fig. 1: Effect of parameters p and m on error rate of Mm,p.
surprisingly, the graphs are virtually indistinguishable from
the analytical results.
In Fig. 1a, we consider scenarios with 3 (dash-dotted), 13
(dashed), 51 (dotted), 201 (solid black), or 1001 (solid gray)
sources providing feedback. The x-axis depicts the probability
that sources are honest. In every scenario, the error rate rapidly
declines initially, and then asymptotically decreases to 0. In
Fig. 1b, we consider scenarios with sources with different
levels of trustworthiness: adequate (0.55, dash-dotted), mod-
erate (0.6, dashed), somewhat (0.7, dotted), standard (0.85,
solid black) and high (0.97, solid gray). Here, the x-axis
depicts the amount of sources giving feedback. This graph
also rapidly declines until asymptotically decreasing to 0, but
with a staircase pattern. The staircase pattern is not an artifact,
as proven later in Lemma 2.
Fig. 1 shows that with p values over 1/2 and the coordinated
attack, the error rate of Mm,p tends to decrease with more
sources.
Monotonicity is the property that better robustness (lower
maximal error rate – E) can be obtained, if more sources are
available. It turns out that there is a disparity between even
and odd numbers of sources: For even m, the E for m sources
and m − 1 sources is the same, but going from m to m + 1
the E goes down.
We use the following property of the binomial distribution:
Proposition 1.
Fbin(k;m+1, p) = Fbin(k−1;m, p) + (1−p)fbin(k;m, p)
Proof. It follows from the following equality of regularised in-
complete beta functions: Ix(a, b+1) = Ix(a, b)+
xa(1−x)b
bB(a,b) [5],
and the fact that Fbin(k,m, p) = I1−p(m− k, k + 1):
Fbin(k;m+1, p) = I1−p(m− k + 1, k + 1) = I1−p(m− k +





= I1−p(m− k+ 1, k) + (1− p)pk(1−
p)m−k m!(m−k)!k! = Fbin(k−1;m, p)+(1−p)fbin(k;m, p).
Lemma 2. Given m is even, E(Mm,p) = E(Mm−1,p).
Proof. E(Mm,p) = Fbin(m2 −1;m, p) + 12fbin(m2 ;m, p).




2 ;m, p), A = Fbin(
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2 − 1;m, p).
Based on Proposition 1, A = Fbin(
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2 −2;m−1, p) +





















2 (1 − p)m2 =pfbin(m2 −1;m − 1, p). Hence,
A + B = Fbin(
m
2 −2;m−1, p) + (1−p)fbin(m2 −1;m −
1, p) + pfbin(
m
2 −1;m − 1, p) = Fbin(m2 − 1;m−1, p) =
E(Mm−1,p).
Intuitively, if one chooses a majority amongst an even
number of sources, then that majority is at least 2 larger than
any other option, and removing a single source would not
change the decision. In case of a tie, removing an source will
have a 50% chance of swaying the result in either option’s
favor.
Lemma 3. Given m is even, E(Mm,p) > E(Mm+1,p).
Proof. E(Mm,p) = Fbin(m2 −1;m, p) + 12fbin(m2 ;m, p).
E(Mm+1,p) = Fbin(
m
2 ;m+1, p) = Fbin(
m
2 −1;m, p) +
(1−p)fbin(m2 ;m, p) (Proposition 1). Since p > 1/2, (1−p) <
1/2, proving the theorem.
Together the two lemmas trivially prove the monotonicity
of decision mechanism M :
Theorem 5. For sets of sources S1 ⊆ S2 of cardinality m
and m′, E(Mm,p) > E(Mm′,p).
All the properties have been proven under the assumption
that p > 1/2. If p ≤ 1/2, then attackers have a higher probability
of achieving a majority than the honest sources. Majority rule
is hardly robust in that case, as ε ≥ 1/2, no matter how many
sources are used. The probability of attackers achieving a
majority actually increases as the number of sources increases,
so majority rule is also not monotonic for p < 1/2. Majority
rule is also not optimal when p < 1/2. If the decision is binary,
then the optimal decision scheme is to simply pick a decision
at random, to have exactly 1/2 probability of deciding correctly.
IV. MOST PLAUSIBLE REALISATIONS
In the previous section, we studied some simplified scenar-
ios, where all sources have a same probability of honesty. In
the proposed Majority Rule decision scheme Mm,p, all sources
are treated the same in decision making. Sometimes, we may
have some specific knowledge about each source and be able
to evaluate their probability of honesty individually, e.g., by
evaluating witness credibility [6] (see Section VII). sources
with different probabilities of honesty should have different
effects on decision making. Intuitively, a decision should be
more inclined to feedback from a more honest source.
Say, Alice is more trustworthy than Bob and Charlie, and
Alice’s feedback is 0, but Bob and Charlie both say 1. How
much more trustworthy does Alice need to be to make it
so that the decision scheme should pick 0? Typically, the
focus would be on determining the probabilities of 0 and
1 being the right decisions, given the feedback. However,
these probabilities depend on the strategies of the attackers,
which may change after we implement our decision scheme.
As before, our approach is to reason about the realisations of
honesty, rather than the actual feedback.
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In this section, each source has a certain probability to be
honest p0, . . . , pm−1 = p. The assumption that the proba-
bilities are independent remains. This means that Δ(r) =∏
s∈r ps ·
∏
s∈r(1− ps) = δm,p.
The Most Plausible Realisations decision scheme Rm,p, is
designed to be optimal when dealing with independent sources
each with their own probability of being honest. Our argument
that the most plausible realisations decision scheme works is
purely based on the robustness and optimality of the scheme
(see Section IV-A). The motivation given below is just to
provide an intuition. It uses the notion of plausibility.
Suppose we have three sources providing feedback f =
(fa, fb, fc). Alice says 0 (fa = 0), whereas Bob and Charlie
say 1 (fb = fc = 1). If 0 is the correct decision, then
Alice reported the truth while the others lied. We use product
pa·(1−pb)·(1−pc) to capture the plausibility that 0 is the
truth. The formula represents the (prior) probability of the
realisation r where Alice is honest, and Bob and Charlie
are not. This realisation r is the most probable realisation
such that f ∈ a(0, r), and as such, the most plausible
explanation. Similarly, let product (1 − pa)·pb·pc denote the
plausibility that 1 is the truth. The most plausible realisation
is, therefore, the realisation with the highest product. So if
pa·(1−pb)·(1−pc) > (1 − pa)·pb·pc, the scheme selects 0;
and if pa·(1−pb)·(1−pc) < (1− pa)·pb·pc, it selects 1.
Again, sources that have a p-value below 1/2 are not helpful.
The decision scheme will simply ignore those sources. Hence,
pi : pi < 1/2 will not occur in the formula of the computation
for plausibility, and we assume ∃s ∈ S : ps ≥ 1/2.
Definition 10 (Plausibility). The plausibility of d ∈ Q being
the correct decision, given feedback f is defined as:





s∈S : fs =d,ps≥1/2
(1− ps)
The decision scheme selects the most plausible decision.
If no decision is the most plausible, we follow source 0.
Note that, as with majority rule, in the case of a tie, any
non-manipulable tie-breaker will do. There is no advantage in
selecting “smart” tie-breakers, as they are equal in robustness
at best, as the choice of following 0 is an optimal one:
Definition 11 (Most Plausible Realisations Decision Scheme).
Rm,p(f) =
{
argmaxd∈Q g(f , d) if defined
f0 otherwise.
Similarly as in Definition 9, m,p are parameters of a
decision scheme that decides the context. We let R represent
a family of such decision schemes, called the most plausible
realisation decision mechanism.
A typical way of using sources is to aggregate them as
a weighted sum, where the weight is determined by the
trustworthiness of the source. Definition 11 can be restated
as a weighted sum:








Proof. The argmax of a function and its logarithm are the
same, as logarithm is increasing. Together with g(f , d) ∝
g(f ,d)∏













·∏s∈S : fs =d,ps≥1/2(1−ps1−ps))∝∑




A. Properties of Most Plausible Realisations
In the context where sources have different probabilities of
being honest, majority rule is no longer typically optimal. The
decision scheme introduced in this section – most plausible
realisations – is optimal, as shown in this section. It is also
monotonic, and has a simple formula computing its robustness:





Proof. Honest sources report c. According to Definition 10,
given a realization r, if attackers want to maximize the plausi-
bility g(f , d) of an option d, d =c, then they all need to report it.
And argmaxf∈a(c,r) g(f , d) = δm,p(r). The plausibility of the
honest option is g(f , c)=δm,p(r). Now if δm,p(r) < δm,p(r),
then it means no dishonest option can be more plausible
than the correct decision in the entire attack space. And the
correct decision will always be chosen. Hence, all realizations
r satisfying this inequality are non-manipulable and they sum
up to 1− E(Rm,p) (Theorem 2).
The most plausible realisation decision scheme is optimal.
No scheme is more robust, when they are given the same set
of sources which are independently honest.
Theorem 7. Given m sources with p as the probability of
being honest, Rm,p is optimal.
Proof. First, |R̂m,p| = 1/2|R| follows from Corollary 1.




, it follows |R \ R̂m,p| is
minimal. |R \ R̂m,p| equals E(Rm,p).
Below, we prove that decision mechanism R is monotonic.
Theorem 8. Let p = p0, . . . , pm−1 and p′ = p0, . . . pm. If
pm > 1/2, then E(Rm,p) > E(Rm+1,p′). If pm ≤ 1/2, then
E(Rm,p) = E(Rm+1,p′).
Proof. Observe δm,p(r) = pm ·δm,p(r)+(1−pm) ·δm,p(r) =





realisation or its complement is in the sum. Via Theorem 7,
that sum is at least
∑
r∈R′|δm+1,p′ (r)≥δm+1,p′ (r) δm+1,p′(r)
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Fig. 2: Graphs depicting the sensitivity of ε to the quality of the estimate.
V. ANALYSIS
We have introduced two decision mechanisms that have a
form of provable robustness: Majority rule (M ) and Most
Plausible Realisation (R). In the analysis, we used a prob-
ability distribution Δ over the possible ways in which people
are honest or malicious. For the first mechanism, we assumed
that all sources were equally likely to be honest, and analysed
the formal properties under that assumption. For the second
mechanism, we assumed that all sources had individual in-
dependent probability to be honest, and analysed the formal
properties under that assumption.
An interesting finding is that monotonicity by itself is insuf-
ficient to deduce that we can achieve arbitrarily low values for
ε (see Fig. 5b). Another interesting, but not unexpected, result
is that usually an attack where all malicious sources agree
on the same lie is often the worst-case attack. However, in
cases where sources are notoriously untrustworthy, this attack
is ineffective. Finally, if we use trust-based values as estimates
for the p-values involved, then we usually get a good ap-
proximation. But there seems to be a phase-shift where worse
approximations suddenly become unreliable. The simulations
show us interesting nuances that the aforementioned proofs
does not.
A. Numerical Analysis
Fig. 2 illustrates optimality. There are four graphs, corre-
sponding to four different attacks, and each graph contains
four lines, corresponding to four decision schemes. The x-
axis denotes the standard deviation of the individual honesty
values p, and the y-axis the error rate. Lower lines, therefore,
correspond to better decisions.
The four decision schemes that we depict contain Mm,p
(dotted) and Rm,p (solid), but also two example decision
schemes: probability weighted sum (P , dashed) and trust-
distrusted weighted sum (T , dash-dotted). Both decision
schemes are based on straightforward approaches to aggre-
gating information from sources with a certain trust value (the
related approaches are discussed in Section VII). In the case
of P , we simply sum the p-values of the sources reporting
a certain value, and pick the highest. In the case of T , we
convert the probability p, to a trust-distrust value in [−1, 1],
by taking 2 ·p−1. These trust-distrust values are summed, and
the highest value wins. So if the result is a1 votes A and a2,
a3 vote B, with p1 = 0.9, p2 = 0.7, p3 = 0.4, then P picks B,
since 0.9 < 0.7+0.4, but T picks A, since 0.8 > 0.4+−0.2.
If ai reports A and pi is small, then in P , ri = A makes
the decision A slightly more likely, but in T , it will actually
reduce the likelihood that A is the decision.
The three attacks we depict are Fig. 2a: coordinated, where
all attackers always report the same lie; Fig. 2b: devious, where
all trusted attackers report the same lie but untrusted attackers
report the truth; Fig. 2c: random, where all attackers randomly
lie; And Fig. 2d, we apply whichever attack that yields the
highest error rate for the scheme.
Each of the simulations uses 100, 000 runs per data point,
11 sources with average p-value 0.6. The choice of a relatively
small set of sources with relatively low honesty is to exagger-
ate the effect that specific attacks have on specific decision
schemes. The p value for each individual is picked from a
normal distribution with mean 0.6 and standard deviation at
the x-axes. y-axis depicts the total rate of deciding incorrectly.
In Fig. 2a, we see that Rm,p typically does not actually have
the lowest error rate under the coordinated attack. An attacker
known to be untrustworthy will lie, meaning the decision
scheme could improve its decisions by doing the opposite.
The T scheme does this, and marginally outperforms Rm,p.
However, a smart attacker would observe the decision scheme
that is being used, and alter its attack strategy in response.
By switching to the devious attack, Fig. 2b, the performance
of T severely degrades, since untrustworthy attackers success-
fully manipulate the decision scheme by reporting the truth,
which T interprets as a lie. In P , the report of an untrust-
worthy attacker is simply discounted proportionally. Since an
untrustworthy attacker always tells the truth (either because
he is honest, or because he is devious), a positive weight for
their vote helps decrease the error rate. In majority rule, the
report of an untrustworthy attacker is not even discounted, and
its positive impact on the error rate is therefore even greater.
Again, if either of these two decision schemes is implemented,
then the attacker can simply apply the coordinated attack,
where these two schemes do not perform well.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that the graph where the
attacker chooses the worst-case attack based on the decision
scheme (Fig. 2d), that the graph of P is similar to the one in
Fig. 2a, and the graphs of T and Mm,p similar to those in
Fig. 2b. The choices of Rm,p are independent of the actions
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(a) Per precision of estimate.
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(b) Per bias of estimate.
Fig. 3: Effect of parameter estimate on error rate of M .
of an untrustworthy source, so its graphs are actually the same
in Figures 2a, 2b and 2d. As predicted by Theorem 7, its error
rate is the lowest under the worst-case attack.
Finally, we see that the overall error rate in the random
attack (Fig. 2c) is vastly lower than the error rate in any other
attacks. The attacker is wasting potential by spreading lies
over 4 different options, which is why it is much less likely
that the decision scheme will err. The reason why T and
Rm,p are unimodal, is because they tend to favour trustworthy
individuals over blocks of relatively untrustworthy sources. As
the standard deviation goes up, the probability that there is a
trustworthy individual goes up – and 10% of people with a p-
value of 0.9 lie. But as the standard deviation continues to go
up, the probability of having multiple trustworthy individuals
goes up, counteracting the occasional trusted attacker. Note
that the random attack, as a consequence, is not particularly
appropriate to use as a basis for comparison.
B. Robustness under Estimated Honesty
To determine whether to follow the majority and how much
robustness (ε) we can get, we need to know the probability
that an source is honest (p), and also whether that p>1/2.
The probability that an arbitrary unknown source is honest, is
equal to the frequency of honest sources within the population
of sources. It is fair to assume that by performing statistical
analysis, the system can obtain a reasonable approximation
of p. Obtaining such an estimate is out of the scope of this
paper. However, our approach is only useful, if it is not overly
sensitive to errors in the approximation of p.
In Fig. 3, we show the findings of two Monte Carlo
simulations with 100, 000 runs. In Fig. 3a, we plot the change
of error rate going from precise estimations of p to imprecise
estimations. Whereas, in Fig. 3b, we plot the change of
error rate going from underestimating p to overestimating
p. The solid lines are: m = 201, p = 0.55; dotted are:
m = 51, p = 0.6; dashed are: m = 13, p = 0.7; and dash-
dotted are: m = 3, p = 0.85.
Fig. 3a models the precision of the estimations, by letting
the probability p of honesty be selected from a normal
distribution whose mean is the estimated p value. The standard
deviation of the normal distribution increases along the x-
axis. The assumption here is that the method to obtain an
estimate is not biased towards overestimating or underestimat-
















(a) Precision of trust opinions.


















(b) Bias of trust models.
Fig. 4: Effect of parameter estimate on error rate of Rm,p
ing, meaning the mean of the normal distribution is equal to
the estimated p value. As the SD increases, the quality of our
estimate degrades, and we see that the error rate goes up. This
effect is particularly pronounced when the p value is low (e.g.
for the solid line), because it becomes increasing probable that
the honest sources are actually outnumbered.
Fig. 3b models the effect of consistently
over/underestimating p. The x-axis shows how much
higher the actual probability of honesty is, compared to our
estimate. On the left side, we have negative x-values, meaning
the actual probability that an sources is honest is lower than
our estimate. The parameters used for the different shape
lines is the same as in Fig. 3a. The graphs match parts of
those found in Fig. 1a, which is unsurprising, considering
that the probability that the majority is right is completely
determined by m and p. The most important observation
here, is that underestimating p puts one in a situation where
the error rate can only be lower than expected.
Trust opinions come in many formats, trust opinions may
not be probabilities, or trust opinions may be defined by a
network of probabilities. In Subjective Logic [7], trust opinions
are an example of the former, where a quantity of uncertainty
is added. SALE POMDP [8], is an example of the latter,
where trust opinions are parameter estimations of partially
observable Markov decision processes. In both models, and in
fact most trust models in general, we can obtain a value that
represents the probability that an source is honest in a specific
situation. Since we are not interested in the mechanism behind
the trust model, and we want to talk about trust models with
generality, we simply refer to the pi-value that represents the
model’s predicted probability of honesty of the source ai as
the trustworthiness of ai.
Using simulations, we can investigate what happens if the
value of p that is used by the decision scheme (i.e. the trust
opinion) is different from the actual probability that an source
is honest. Each of the Monte Carlo simulations uses 100, 000
runs for every datapoint. The value of n = 5, unless stated
otherwise. Its value typically is not important (see Fig. 6).
Throughout the discussion, we use “trustworthiness” or “trust
opinion” to refer to what the decision scheme believes the
value of p is; and the actual value of p is referred to simply
as the probability that the source is honest.
In Fig. 4 the trustworthiness of the individual sources
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(a) Wrong perception of p.















(b) A limit on error rate.
Fig. 5: Two unrelated graphs with unexpected results.
should be different, but we do not want to enforce any
particular values. Therefore, the individual trustworthiness of
each source is chosen from a normal distribution with mean
p, and standard deviation 0.08. In both graphs, the actual
probability of honesty differs from the trustworthiness in some
way. The solid lines are: m = 201, p = 0.55; dotted are:
m = 51, p = 0.6; dashed are: m = 13, p = 0.7; and dash-
dotted are: m = 3, p = 0.85.
Fig. 4a models the precision of the individual trust opin-
ions with a normal distribution. The actual probability that
sources are honest in a simulation run, is a sample from
this distribution. The assumption here is that the method to
obtain an estimate is not biased towards overestimating or
underestimating, meaning the mean of the normal distribution
is equal to the estimated p value. The standard deviation of the
normal distribution is depicted on the x-axis, with the correct
estimate on the left hand side. For the first three lines, the
graphs are flat. The trust opinions are allowed to be poor
estimates (e.g. p = 0.6 ± 0.08), and it will not affect the
quality of the decision scheme. The fourth line, on the other
hand, has a minute increase. The error rate goes up slightly,
because there is a reasonable probability that an source has
a probability of being honest larger than 0.5, but the trust
opinion is below 0.5, and the source is ignored in the decision
scheme.
Fig. 4b models the effect of a biased estimate, where the
trust opinions may over/underestimate the average p-value.
The average probability of honesty is selected from a normal
distribution with the mean being the average trustworthiness,
and the standard deviation is on the x-axis. This models the
possibility that the whole process of obtaining trust opinions
is biased, and optimistic or pessimistic. For high p values, the
bias has some effect, but even with a standard deviation of
5 percent points, the error rate only goes up about a percent
point, for the graphs with p = 0.7 and p = 0.85. For low p
values, the bias can have a large effect. The reason is that, for
p = 0.55 and a standard deviation of 0.06, the possibility
that the majority of the raters are actually malicious (but
with positive trustworthiness) less than a standard deviation
away. A situation where the trustworthiness is positive, but the
probability of honesty is smaller than 1/2 is disastrous for our
scheme. For security critical purposes, therefore, it is important
to ensure such a situation is highly improbable.
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(a) Attacks on Mm,p and Rm,p.
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(b) Per size of coalition.
Fig. 6: Effect of increasing the options for feedback.
In Fig. 5a, the trust opinion is formed based on the actual
probability of honesty, and the simulation is run with that
probability of honesty (but the decision scheme uses the trust
opinion). The results corroborate those from Fig. 4a. The
scenario is as follows: There are 4 users, a special source
whose p value varies, two sources with p = 0.6 and one source
with p = 0.55. The simulation performs a multitude of runs for
every true p value with increments of 0.05. Each run computes
the estimated p value (which comes from a normal distribution
with standard deviation 0.1), and if the decision scheme
decides (in)correctly, this is counted for the estimated p value.
The x markers are placed at places where the decisions are
counted. The dotted line is the theoretical prediction, if the
trust values were always equal to the probability of honest.
We can see that the decision scheme performs exceptionally
close to the theoretical maximum, despite an error of 0.1 on
our trust opinion being just one standard deviation.
It would seem logical that any ε-robustness can be reached,
simply by pumping p and m. Figures 1b show that increasing
m will lower the error rate asymptotically to 0. However, in
both graphs the (expected) value for p is kept constant. There
are realistic scenarios one can think of, where this is not the
case. Often, users simply want to minimise the amount of
feedback they need to gather, and an easy way is to start by
requesting feedback from trustworthy sources first. But that
implies that the next sources on the list to provide feedback
will be less trustworthy!
In Fig. 5b, we draw the error rate, as increasingly less
trustworthy sources are added to the list. As sources with a
p value below 1/2 are ignored, we ignore these values in the
simulation too. So the decreasingly trustworthy sources will
still have p values over 1/2. The sequences of p values of







which start at 0.731 and 0.750, and asymptotically decrease
to 0.500. We see the error rates have asymptotes at 0.19 and
0.20, respectively.
Finally, in Fig. 6, we look at the number of options for
feedback. So far, all simulations used n = 5. And the reason
is that, under the coordinated attack, the value of n does
not matter. The reason is that the attacker only ever picks
1 other value. For Rm,p, the coordinated attack is the attack
that maximises the error rate, so this attack was used in the
simulations. Fig. 6a depicts the fact that n does not matter
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under the coordinated attack.
In Fig. 6a, the coordinated attack on Rm,p is solid, the
random attack on Rm,p is dashed, the coordinated attack on
Mm,p is dotted and the random attack on Mm,p is dash-
dotted. The value of n has no impact on the error rate
under coordinated attacks. But for random attacks, the error
rate rapidly declines. As attackers spread their answers over
different lies, the true value will stand out.
In Fig. 6b, we introduce a generalisation of the coordinated
attack, where there is a coalition of attackers providing the
same answer, and non-coalition members lie randomly. The
probability of membership of the coalition is 1 (solid), 0.6
(dash-dotted), 0.4 (dashed) and 0 (dotted). The decrease of
error rate is not linear w.r.t. the size of the coalition.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we build a foundation for making decisions
while resisting manipulation from malicious sources in a prob-
abilistic way. Our results are derived based on the assumptions
of an idealistic world. In the following, we discuss the practical
implication of our assumptions. We start with the strong
assumption of honesty and then other assumptions.
Our goal is to reason more effectively about information
from potentially malicious sources. The idea is to reason
about realisations and design a decision scheme; rather to
decide based on concrete feedback in an ad-hoc way. The
majority rule and most plausible realisations decision schemes
demonstrate feasibility in an academic setting (where ad-hoc
decisions are not). There are applications where our assump-
tions are reasonable, as we argue in this section. However,
for many applications, domain-specific assumptions may be
necessary. We argue, in this section, that these domain-specific
assumptions do not typically form a hinder for building a
robust decision mechanism based on realisations.
A. Models of Honesty
The robustness, optimality and monotonicity of Mm,p and
Rm,p have been formally defined based on the strong as-
sumption of honesty. Recall that the strong assumption of
honesty is that honest sources’ feedback is equivalent to the
correct decision. In this section, we consider the assumption
of honesty in three classes of applications i.e., those where it
is reasonable, those where it works as a modelling trick, and
those where a weaker assumption is more appropriate. For the
last case, we also look at what changes may be required.
Trusted third parties in security protocols are an example
where the strong assumption of honesty is typically reasonable.
Such a protocol prescribes the response (feedback) of the
trusted third party, and it prescribes how the response should
be used. For example, it is reasonable to assume that if a
certificate authority is honest, then the link that their certificate
suggests between a public key and a name is genuine. Looking
through the lens of our approach, robustness of the public
key infrastructure supporting the Web is obtained by having
extremely high p values. Compromised certificate authorities
are seldom trusted by browsers in default settings; DigiNotar
[9] being a notable exception. The Web of Trust – introduced
to support Pretty Good Privacy [10] – is an example of a public
key infrastructure without certificate authorities. Instead, other
users sign certificates linking public keys to identities; they
know the person uses the public key via an offline personal
connection. An honest participant is a participant who actually
verifies what they sign, and is unlikely to mistakenly link a
person with a wrong/different public key.
There are applications where the link between correct
feedback and the right decision is straightforward, but honest
sources sufficiently often fail to provide the correct feedback
for the assumption of honesty to be a realistic idealisation.
For example, network nodes sending routing messages may
unwittingly send incorrect information (e.g., due to malfunc-
tioning), or copyright protection using image recognition may
fail to recognise (or spuriously recognise) infringement. A
subtle change in semantics may be sufficient to be able to
apply our results here. We can let the probability p mean
“honest and accurate” and 1 − p “malicious or mistaken”. In
the case of a node on a network, we can consider a node to
have probability p to provide accurate information about the
network, and a probability 1− p of being malicious, mistaken
or mislead. Unlike a malicious source, a mistaken source does
not have an associated attack space, but selects a specific
value (or distribution) from the attack space. It follows from
Definition 4 that replacing a malicious source by a mistaken
one in a realisation will not make it manipulable. Hence,
the results on robustness and monotonicity properties remain
applicable. However, optimality may not be, as eliminating
possibilities in the attack space may give rise to a better way
of deciding (see example at the end of this section).
There are many domain-specific assumptions about honesty
that we can make for given applications. For malware report-
ing, if an app is updated, older honest feedback only refers
to the previous version. The more updates there are since
the feedback, the more likely that the honest feedback no
longer corresponds to the correct decision. But also, feedback
that an app is safe is more likely to become mistaken than
feedback that an app is malicious. In vehicular networks, an
understanding of how traffic works needs to be built in. Some
traffic information can be quickly outdated (e.g., collisions,
speed traps), and some can be persistent (e.g., a new bridge
or speed radar). Using the reported speeds of the GPS of road
users can be a smart way to determine whether there is heavy
traffic. A general way to aggregate such information, is have
a stochastic relation between the correct decision and honest
feedback (i.e. a probability of reporting a certain thing). Our
model would need to be extended with one more probability
distribution γ, determining the probabilities of honest feedback




Δ(r) · β(r, c)(f) · γ(r, c)(f)
To illustrate this further, assume we have light sensors that
can distinguish red, green and blue. Assume the probability
of a sensor being malicious is 25%, being mistaken is 35%,
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and being correct is 40%. We can use the modelling trick of
letting p = 0.4, and obtain a negative result: we cannot achieve
meaningful robustness, since p < 1/2. However, we happen to
know – for the sake of the example – that the sensors’ mistakes
are predictable: it always misreports red as green, green as
blue, and blue as red. Rather than using the majority rule, the
decision scheme could be to identify the least reported color,
and select red/green/blue if it is blue/red/green, respectively.
This rule results in the right decision for realisations where
malicious sources are the smallest group – which is quite
plausible, and increasingly plausible as we add more sensors.
Therefore, this decision scheme clearly outperforms majority
rule with p = 0.4, hence our earlier claim that this approach
does not preserve optimality.
B. Realisation-based Decisions
Secure secret sharing [11] is an example where an assump-
tion similar to the strong assumption of honesty does apply. In
(t, n) secret sharing, there are n participants that communicate
with each other, and, if at least t participants are honest, then
they eventually know the shared secret. For an honest partici-
pant, t−1 out of the n−1 remaining others need to be honest.
In scenarios where secret sharing is applied routinely (e.g.
distributed pseudo random number generation [12]) a lower
bound probability of successful secret sharing is required. In-
terestingly, the success of secure secret sharing protocols does
not hinge on the attack space not containing misleading values,
but on it being computationally difficult to find misleading
values in the enormous attack space. This means that even
Theorem 1 does not apply to secret sharing. Nevertheless, as
demonstrated in [12], reasoning about realisations remains an
effective way of accomplishing this. Reasoning based on real-
isations is also applied to anonymity networks like TOR [13].
An important question is whether reasoning about realisa-
tions is also a useful endeavor when the probability of honesty
of sources is not independent. In a Sybil attack, an attacker
controls multiple sources, and uses them in a coordinated way.
An aspect is that malicious sources’ feedback is coordinated,
and this aspect is covered by our model. Another aspect of the
Sybil attack, is that the attacker tries to ensure that multiple
sources are malicious. If the sources are selected by the
decision maker, then this may or may not be possible. But if
the sources offer their information to the decision maker, then
it is trivial to ensure all Sybils are included, and independence
does not hold. To capture Sybil attacks in these cases, we must
go beyond choices for Δ where p-values are independent.
One way to deal with dependent p values, is to use over
approximation, which our simulations suggest is safe. A single
source is independent by definition. Introducing a second node,
we have the probabilities P (s2 ∈ R|s1 ∈ R) and P (s2 ∈
R|s1 ∈ R), which are not necessarily equal. However, we
can safely select p2 as the minimum of these values, ensuring
that if the robustness is computed with independent p1 and p2,
then it is an overestimate. This strategy is not optimal.
None of the definitions and theorems in Section II use
the notion that sources are independent, and are defined for
general distributions of realisations Δ. A brute-force approach
could go through all attainable sets of realisations and find
the one where honesty states of sources are most probable.
Unfortunately, the number of attainable sets of realisations
grows exponentially. More study is required to determine
whether finding the optimal decision scheme is computation-
ally feasible, or alternatively, whether effective heuristics exist
to get near optimal decision schemes.
The techniques used in this paper can be used to prove dif-
ferent properties and theorems, if the assumptions are changed
appropriately. We hope that our approach helps develop more
formal and robust ways of making trust-based decisions.
VII. RELATED WORK
The problem of malicious feedback (a.k.a unfair/fake rat-
ings) has been popularly studied in application and research
domains such as e-commerce [14]–[20], web service [21],
[22], trust and reputation systems [23]–[25], multi-agent sys-
tems [26]–[28] and recommendation systems [21], [29]. In
this section, we present related works dealing with malicious
feedback and decision making under it.
Trust forms the foundation for information sharing. For
example, feedback from more trustworthy peers are usually
considered more reliable. In the literature, filtering (or dis-
counting) feedback based on its providers’ honesty (a.k.a
advisor honesty/witness trust) is a popular way of treating
malicious feedback [26].
There are various factors to measure honesty of feedback
sources. One of them is similarity between feedback and the
self experience of a decision maker, the use of which can
be seen in early works such as [14], [26], [30] and also
recent ones [20], [27], [31]. In [14], [20], [31], clustering
algorithms are applied to distinguish malicious sources from
honest ones. Feedback identified as unfair would be filtered
out. For example, Liu et al. propose to cluster feedback, and
sources whose feedback belongs to the same cluster with the
decision maker would be considered reliable [31]. In [27],
Weng et al. propose to use the statistical correlation between
the history feedback of a source and the decision maker’s
experience, to determine the credibility of the source. Only
feedback from sources whose credibility is higher than an
advisee’s own confidence is aggregated, by weighted average,
where the weights depend on credibility.
Besides similarity, some other criteria (e.g., feedback
timestap, social relation) are also used to distinguish malicious
sources. Both Yang et al. [23], Liu and Sun [32] propose to
detect suspicious time intervals where attacks are more likely,
and highly suspicious feedback would be abandoned. In [19],
a source is considered malicious if he has reviewed two or
more products targeted by crowdsourcing requests in a short
while. It is assumed in [29] that similarities between malicious
sources are higher than that between honest ones. In [20], the
correlation among feedback criteria is considered e.g., high
score for quality and low score for service time may occur
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simultaneously for an honest source, while such correlation is
assumed not true for an attacker.
In [28], to determine the degree of importance and reliability
of feedback in multi-agent systems, Sabater and Sierra propose
to exploit social relations among agents. For instance, if an
advisor is found to have high level of cooperation with the
agent he provides feedback, then that feedback is suspected
of being biased and his social trust is assigned low. In [16], to
detect fraud online reviews, Akoglu et al. build a network for
users, reviews and products, and propose a network classifica-
tion algorithm to label attackers and fake reviews. It is assumed
that attackers would more probably provide positive (negative)
review for bad (good) products compared with honest sources.
This assumption is also applied in [18], where detecting fake
review is also formulated as a network-based classification
problem, but compared with [16], more metadata such as
review texts, timestamp, relational data are considered.
Our decision scheme also relies on probability of honesty
of sources. A crucial difference between our approach and
the aforementioned is that there is no need to detect or filter
out malicious feedback before aggregation. We have already
proved that it is fallacious to discount or filtering feedback that
deviate from the majority or from the first-hand evidence [33].
Filtering out deviated feedback may cause confirmation bias.
In the existing approaches, there are often assumptions
about the characteristics of attacks, which make them reactive.
For example, attackers are characterized as providing unfairly
highly low (bad-mouthing attacks) or high (ballot-stuffing
attacks) ratings are considered in [14], [16], [18], [21]. Such
characterization restricts attacker behaviour to specific as-
sumed types, ignoring other possibilities. In practice, attackers
are usually adaptive: updating their strategies regarding the
changes in the decision scheme or in the system. As a result,
assumptions about strategies are incompatible with robustness.
Therefore, to achieve robustness, we must have a proactive
position on strategies, allowing them to be of arbitrary form.
In our model, we treat honesty of sources as given, as we
focus on how to exploit these parameters in a way that it
can lead us to provably accurate decisions. Hence, how to
accurately evaluate source honesty is out of the scope of this
work. In the interest of having a simple model, we assume that
honest users would simply report the truth, while in practise it
is more complicated. For example, as it is pointed out in [34],
even if a user is honest, his feedback can be biased in multiple
ways. It would be interesting to extend our decision scheme to
cover situations where bias from honest sources is considered.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We investigated how to provably make correct decisions
with high probability, using potentially malicious feedback.
Our model assumed that feedback can be modeled as discrete
options, one of which is reported by honest sources. The
influence the feedback has on our decisions is determined by
the (perceived) probability that an source is honest.
We defined two decision mechanisms: Majority Rule and
Most Plausible Realisations. We defined three properties for
a desired decision scheme based on unreliable feedback: ro-
bustness, monotonicity, and optimality. Regarding robustness,
we proved that for both the decision mechanisms, the proba-
bility of making incorrect decisions is bound to a very small
threshold, regards of what attackers report. The robustness of
both the schemes monotonically increases with the number
of sources whose honesty degree is over a half. Given a
feedback scenario, the robustness of both the schemes is
optimal, meaning there’s no scheme with better robustness.
We rely on knowledge about the honesty of sources, which
might be inaccurate in practise. Hence, we run simulations to
test how sensitive the decision schemes are to the deviation
that estimated trustworthiness has from the actual probability
of honesty. We found that if our estimate is imprecise, but not
biased, then it has no effect on robustness; and if it is imprecise
and biased, it has limited effect. An exception is when sources
that are probably malicious are considered trustworthy, in
which case robustness is quickly out the window.
Using simulations, we also provided insight into how attacks
and decision schemes relate. A decision scheme that attempts
to exploit certain attack strategies is vulnerable. The two pre-
sented optimal decision schemes ignore untrustworthy sources
completely as a result.
This work aims to improve the robustness of decision
making under unreliable information sources. The robustness
of such decision making is crucial especially when it is for
security domains. An incorrect decision can put a system under
threat. Besides the concrete schemes that we formulated, the
core contribution is the demonstration and application of a
novel technique to reason about manipulation. We introduced
the notion of realisations, which made it possible to investi-
gate whether one is manipulable, without studying the actual
manipulative behaviour. Large summations of combinations of
feedback that affect the actual decision could be cancelled out
of the formula, by applying the idea of realisations.
Besides the obtained formal results, this work serves as a
proof-of-concept for an alternative way of considering trust
in the security domain. Rather than focussing on making the
right decision with some given feedback, our approach takes a
step back and asks under which circumstances do we want to
make the right decision. Typically, we want to make the right
decision under the most probable circumstances.
In this paper, we introduce two fairly simple schemes. We
believe that the technique can be extended to more complex
scenarios, as we address in the discussion section. In particular,
the weak assumption of honesty should be sufficient to arrive
at similar conclusions, and independency of sources being
honest may not be necessary to obtain positive results either.
An aspect that we have not yet studied is when sources provide
feedback about multiple things. The next step is to apply the
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